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Fundamental to the status-based model of market competition is the notion that organizational status is a basis for product market advantage (Podolny, 1993; . When product or service quality is difficult to verify ex ante -frequently for cultural goods (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; Bielby and Bielby, 1999) or professional services (Podolny, 1993; 1994; Chung, Singh, and Lee, 2000; Jensen, 2006; Jensen and Roy, 2008; Uzzi and Lancaster, 2004 ) -market actors generally infer quality from the status of the organization offering it for sale. Consequently, relative to low status competitors, high status organizations enjoy lower marketing costs, higher prices, and greater sales, resulting in a typically positive correlation between organizational status and profitability (Podolny, 1993; Podolny, Stuart, and Hannan, 1996; Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; Podolny and Scott-Morton, 1999) .
Prior research does not similarly establish status-based advantages in factor markets, despite interest in such advantages. Most prominently, Podolny (2001: 43) speculates that hiring and retention costs for equivalent labor are decreasing with status because individuals generally view high employer status as a non-pecuniary employment benefit. Low status organizations are, consequently, constrained to hiring from highly uncertain market segments (i.e., inexperienced candidates). Recently, Bidwell, et al. (2013) argue that, relative to low status competitors, high status employers can hire more capable junior employees at equivalent cost because individuals expect future career opportunities to be increasing with employer status. But, despite extensive recent research on hiring competitors' employees (e.g., Rao and Drazin, 2002; Broschak, 2004; Wezel, Cattani, and Pennings, 2006; Groysberg, Nanda, and Lee, 2008; Dokko and Rosenkopf, 2010) , the advantages of status in labor markets remain largely speculative.
In this study, we examine whether or not organizational status aids in employee hiring or retention. We draw on the economic concept of equalizing differences (Rosen, 1986) , which suggests that individuals trade-off pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits in employment alternatives (e.g., Stern, 2004) . We specifically consider how, by providing a basis for non-pecuniary benefits, organizational status aids in hiring competitors' employees and in retaining employees valued by competitors.
Assumptions of individual and organizational preferences inform baseline predictions about which organizations within an industry are most likely to hire each other's employees. We theorize a central tendency of organizations to hire employees from competitors of similar status and profitability. But, we also argue that deviations from these tendencies entail individual trade-offs between pecuniary and nonpecuniary employment benefits that favor high status organizations over lower status ones.
We situate our inquiry in U.S. legal services, an industry characterized by increased hiring from competitors over the past decade (see Figure 1) . Specifically, we analyze data on thousands of lateral partner hires among the largest U.S. law firms between 2000 and 2009. We find that organizations do tend to hire employees from competitors of similar status and profitability, but two labor market advantages of organizational status are clear. First, high status firms are more likely to hire a partner from a more profitable competitor than are low status firms. Second, high status firms are most likely to lose a partner to a lower status competitor when the competitor is atypically profitable, given its status. Extant theory suggests that the hiring advantage enhances profitability and that the retention advantage maintains status. We attribute both advantages to employer status as a valuable non-pecuniary employment benefit.
-----------------------------------------Insert Figure 1 About Here -----------------------------------------
We discuss the implications of our study for intraprofessional status mobility (i.e., individual transitions to employers of different status), for our understanding of the commonly observed positive correlation between organizational profitability and organizational status, and for the stability of industry status hierarchies. These considerations motivate a research agenda on organizational status attainment that parallels the extensive literature on individual status attainment (see Lin, 1999 for a review).
Theoretical Development
The status-based model of market competition introduced the idea that organizational status signals product or service quality in markets where quality is either difficult or costly for consumers to verify ex ante (Podolny, 1993) . Ex ante, consumers generally expect offering quality to be increasing with producer status. Ex post, high status producers also receive greater recognition and rewards for work of equivalent quality than low status actors receive because status enhances visibility and positively biases the allocation of credit (Merton, 1968) . In the context of market competition, these tendencies imply that while nothing in principle prevents low status organizations from investing in high quality, high status organizations realize greater returns on such investments (Podolny, 1993; Benjamin and Podolny, 1999) .
High status producers consequently realize higher prices for offerings of equivalent quality.
These effects are especially pronounced in professional services, such as investment banking (Podolny, 1993; 1994; Chung, et al., 2000) , accounting (Jensen, 2006; Jensen and Roy, 2008) , and corporate law (Uzzi and Lancaster, 2004) as well as in markets for cultural goods in which quality is also difficult to verify ex ante. For example, wine of equal quality tends to be priced higher for high status producers than for low status ones (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999) . Furthermore, wineries that hire winemakers from prominent competitors command higher prices, post-hire, for wines of a given quality -even wines made by prior winemakers (Roberts, Khaire, and Rider, 2011) .
The advantages of status are not limited to revenue. High status organizations also incur lower costs of marketing equivalent quality offerings because exchange partners are more willing to enter exchange relationships the greater the organization's status is (Podolny, 1993) . For example, low status venture capital firms must offer startups better financing terms than high status competitors in order to secure equity investments (Hsu, 2004) . Both revenue and cost advantages are, therefore, implicated in the widely-observed positive correlation between organizational profitability and status (see Podolny, 2005) .
Given these product market advantages of status, profit-seeking organizations often invest resources in attaining higher status and in maintaining status, primarily by adopting principles of exclusivity in inter-organizational relations (Goode, 1978; Podolny, 1993) . Generally, affiliating with lower status organizations diminishes organizational status while affiliating with higher status ones enhances status (Podolny and Phillips, 1996) . For example, status-anxious organizations quickly disassociated themselves from discredited auditor Arthur Andersen following the Enron scandal (Jensen, 2006) and wineries were more likely to publicize a winemaker's prior employer the greater the prior employer's status (Roberts and Khaire, 2009 ).
Labor markets enable profit-seeking organizations to strategically invest in status. First, individual transitions between employers transfer status by implicitly affiliating one's current and prior employers (Baty, et al., 1971; Sørensen, 1999) . Second, especially when quality is difficult to assess ex ante, employees' prior employment affiliations are effective product market signals of organizational quality (Burton, Sorensen, and Beckman, 2002; Higgins and Gulati, 2003; . Third, organizations often transfer status by hiring competitors' employees (Rao and Drazin, 2002; Wezel, et al., 2006; Somaya, Williamson, and Lorinkova, 2008; Dokko and Rosenkopf, 2010; Bidwell and Briscoe, 2010) .
If organizations hire employees to enhance status and profitability, then high status organizations may be particularly vulnerable to losing employees to competitors but also likely to hire employees from competitors. Below, we accordingly consider how status and profitability differentials between organizations influence the baseline likelihood that one organization hires an employee from another one.
We then consider how organizational status aids in the hiring and retention of employees.
Status differentials and the likelihood of hiring. We first make explicit assumptions about individual and organizational preferences. First, affiliating with higher status organizations generally enhances organizational status (Podolny and Phillips, 1996) and attracts exchange partners (Burton, et al., 2002) . More specifically, prior research demonstrates that hiring individuals previously employed by high status employers enhances market actors' evaluations of the hiring organization. For example, biotech executives' prior employment affiliations to high status organizations appeal to investors and, consequently, underwriters (Higgins and Gulati, 2003; . Another study found that hiring winemakers from prominent competitors enabled wineries to command higher prices (Roberts, et al., 2011) . Based on such findings, we assume that, all else equal, organizations prefer to hire individuals from higher status competitors than from lower status ones.
Second, the individual desire for greater social standing is generally considered universal (Frank, 1985; Hogan and Hogan, 1991) . With respect to employment, individuals typically aspire to greater intraprofessional status and, therefore, seek work with high status organizations (Abbott, 1981; Elsbach and Glynn, 1996; Heinz, et al., 2005) . The benefits of working for a high status employer are not merely psychological. Because socioeconomic rewards are also allocated in ways that favor employees of high status organizations (Merton, 1968) , individuals can also expect that future career opportunities are enhanced by employer status (Phillips, 2001; Bidwell, et al., 2013 ). All else equal, then, employer status is a valuable non-pecuniary employment benefit; individuals generally prefer to work for organizations that are higher in status than their current employers.
These assumptions imply that, with respect to organizational status, a focal organization's willingness to hire an individual is generally increasing as an individual's willingness to work for the organization is decreasing. We expect that these countervailing preferences will tend to restrict interorganizational hiring to organizations of similar status because individuals generally like their statusconferring actions to be reciprocated (Gould, 2002) and because unsuccessful hiring attempts are costly for organizations. We, therefore, expect that the higher or lower a competitor is in status than an organization, the less likely the competitor is to hire an employee from that organization.
Hypothesis 1: An organization is less likely to hire an employee from a competitor the greater is the difference in status between the organization and the competitor.
Profitability differentials and the likelihood of hiring. The status differential prediction is motivated by differences in the non-pecuniary benefit of employer status. Differences in pecuniary benefits are, of course, also relevant. All else equal, more profitable organizations can afford to allocate greater financial resources to pecuniary benefits than less profitable organizations can.
1 For example, empirical studies tend to find that employee compensation is increasing with employer profitability (e.g., Deckop, 1988; Gerhart and Milkovich, 1990; Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis, 1999) . We, therefore, assume that pecuniary benefits are increasing with organizational profitability so that individuals generally prefer working for organizations that are more profitable than their current employers.
Organizations, however, typically prefer hiring from more profitable competitors than from less profitable ones because, on average, employee productivity is presumably increasing with employer profitability (Sørensen and Sorenson, 2007) . As in the case of status differentials, countervailing preferences of organizations and individuals will tend to constrain lateral hiring to organizations of similar profitability. We, therefore, expect that the higher or lower a competitor is in profitability than an organization, the less likely the organization is to hire an employee from that competitor. Consequently, we expect that organizational status aids in hiring employees from competitors and also in retaining employees who competitors wish to hire. We consider these implications below.
Status advantages in hiring. We first consider how organizational status facilitates the hiring of competitors' employees. Employee recruitment is central to an organization's competitive advantage. As prior work demonstrates, hiring is an effective strategy for acquiring knowledge (e.g., Almeida and Kogut, 1999) , business relationships (e.g., Somaya, et al., 2008; Dokko and Rosenkopf, 2010) , and capabilities (e.g., Rao and Drazin, 2002 ). Yet, hiring advantages based on organizational status have gone largely unexplored in prior research.
We assume that organizations prefer hiring employees from more profitable competitors than from less profitable ones because of presumed employee productivity differences that vary systematically with organizational profitability (Sørensen and Sorenson, 2007) . The theory of equalizing differences implies that individuals considering a move to a less profitable employer will probably expect greater non-pecuniary benefits (Rosen, 1986; Fersthman and Weiss, 1993; Stern, 2004) . In such cases, nonpecuniary benefits associated with employer status probably help high status organizations hire a more profitable competitor's employee. As Coleman (1990: 130) observes, ''…the awarding of status to balance unequal transactions or to make possible half-transactions appears to be the most widespread functional substitute for money in social and political systems.'' Consequently, we expect that a high status organization is more likely to hire an employee from a more profitable competitor than a low status organization is. Such hires are, presumably, profitability-enhancing. Coff, 1997) , as prior work demonstrates that employee departures can lead to the dissolution of business relationships (e.g., Broschak, 2004) or entire organizations (e.g., Phillips, 2001; Wezel, et al., 2006 ). Yet, status-based retention advantages have also been neglected in prior work.
We previously assumed that high status organizations' employees are valued by competitors because high status affiliations enhance organizational status (Podolny and Phillips, 1996; Jensen, 2006) .
Low status competitors may seek to invest in status by hiring a higher status organization's employees.
Such hires are, presumably, status-enhancing for the hiring competitor and status-diminishing for the organization (e.g., Podolny and Phillips, 1996) . How can a low status competitor facilitate such moves?
Again, the theory of equalizing differences implies that individuals considering a move to a lower status employer will expect to be compensated for a reduction in employer status with greater pecuniary benefits. Therefore, a competitor trying to hire an employee away from a higher status organization must offer greater pecuniary benefits than the employee's current employer provides. If profitability enables organizations to make such attractive offers, then high status organizations are most at risk of losing employees to their more profitable competitors.
Recruiting a less profitable competitor's employees may seem a profit-diminishing strategy. But, in the long run, such status investments could plausibly increase organization profitability by enhancing organizational status and diminishing competitor status, thereby reducing the higher status organization's product market advantage. Low status organizations should, therefore, be particularly motivated to hire employees away from high status ones. For example, although low status universities incur greater costs of employing equivalent quality faculty than high status universities enhanced institutional status may justify incurring higher costs (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Podolny, 2001) .
If status enables organizations to offer greater non-pecuniary benefits than lower-status-but-moreprofitable competitors offer, then low status organizations have weaker bargaining power with a given job candidate than high status competitors do (Podolny, 2001; Phillips, 2001; Bidwell, et al., 2013) . We consequently expect that a high status organization is more likely to lose an employee to a lower status competitor when the competitor is also more profitable than the high status organization. This reasoning implies that high status organizations are most vulnerable to losing employees to competitors that are atypically profitable, given their status (i.e., hierarchical anomalies).
Hypothesis 4: An organization is more likely to lose an employee to a lower status competitor if the competitor is more profitable than if the competitor is less profitable than the organization.
To recap, we propose that despite individual and organizational preferences to the contrary, most inter-organizational employment transitions are between organizations of similar status and profitability.
We also argue that by enabling organizations to offer employment with superior non-pecuniary employment benefits, status provides two labor market advantages over competitors. First, status aids in hiring employees of more profitable competitors. Second, although greater profitability helps organizations hire employees from higher status competitors, the second labor market advantage of status is that status helps organizations retain employees recruited by more profitable but lower status competitors. Below, we outline empirical tests of these arguments.
Empirical Setting and Analysis
The context for testing these predictions is the U.S. legal services industry. We analyze hiring events involving partners employed by the 200 highest-grossing law firms in the U.S. between 2000 and 2009 (i.e., the AM Law 200). These large, corporate-oriented, U.S. law firms are typically organized as partnerships in which firm partners generate business, share profits, and supervise associate lawyers. Firm status and profitability are particularly relevant for hiring because lawyers are particularly status-conscious and many face large debt obligations (Phillips and Zuckerman, 2001; Sauder, 2008) .
Furthermore, firm status is regularly assessed by industry surveys and so, too, is firm profitability.
Traditionally, law firms followed the "Cravath model" by growing internally, promoting associates, developing partners, and fostering client relationships (Galanter and Palay, 1991) . Associates were promoted if partners felt that they would successfully transition from technical legal work to partner responsibilities. The typical law school graduate joined a major law firm and hoped to become a partner after six to eight years. Those who did would typically stay with the firm for the remainder of their professional careers; those who did not would depart. Rarely would lawyers be hired into a partnership from outside of the firm or dismissed after promotion to partner (Heinz, 2009 ).
Hiring competitors' partners has long been a law firm growth strategy (e.g., McEvily, Jaffee, and Tortoriello, 2012) . But, until recently, such lateral hires were considered counter-normative because lateral hiring appropriates a competitor's investments in employees (Hillman, 2002) . This norm eroded as firm scale and competition increased and the costs of adhering to the Cravath Model's "up or out" rule grew larger (Sherer and Lee, 2002) . Over the past decade, lateral hiring has increasingly become an effective strategy for enhancing firm growth and performance because the work that partners perform does not fundamentally vary across employers, but prices do vary (Uzzi and Lancaster, 2004) . Firm motivations for hiring laterally vary but can generally be characterized as status-seeking and profit-seeking. An industry search consultant remarked in 2013, "…reasons number one, two, and three are to buy business" (Li, 2013) . One firm chairman justified hiring a partner from a more prestigious competitor as a way to "make a mark" in the industry (Koppel, 2007) . In 2006, an industry observer described lateral hiring as "skim[ming] the cream of partners from less profitable firms" (Triedman, 2006) . As for individuals, a survey of over 900 partners who moved laterally indicated that 90 percent either maintained or increased their compensation but also that partners who did not move were similarly satisfied with their compensation (Major, Lindsey, and Africa, 2012) . These results imply that partners probably view pecuniary and non-pecuniary employment benefits as compensatory. Moreover, our assumption of a positive correlation between firm profitability and compensation is appropriate for this setting because firm partners are typically residual claimants on firm profits (Galanter and Palay, 1991) .
In sum, lateral hiring by large U.S. law firms is an excellent setting for identifying status-based labor market advantages. Table 1 summarizes annual counts of firms, dyads, and lateral hires for our sample. Table 1 About Here
Logit estimates are biased when the unconditional probability of a binary event is low. So, we correct coefficient estimates and standard errors to account for the systematic bias attributable to the dependent variable's low unconditional mean. Using a rare-events logit specification, we model the likelihood of firm i hiring a partner from firm j in year t (King and Zeng, 2001) . To account for nonindependence of observations attributable to the same dyads appearing multiple times in our sample, we also cluster errors by dyad. Alternatively, clustering errors by hiring firm, by source firm, or simultaneously by hiring firm and source firm yields results consistent with those we report.
Independent variables. The key independent variables are status and profitability differentials between hiring firm i and source firm j. Our status measure is each firm's prestige score from Vault.com's annual law firm rankings. Annually, Vault identifies the 100 most prestigious law firms in the U.S. based on interviews with lawyers, industry news, prior rankings of law firms, and surveys of thousands of associates working at these firms. Thousands of associates rate firms, on a scale of 1 to 10, based on how prestigious they believe working for each firm would be. Respondents do not rate their own firms and are asked not to rate firms with which they are not familiar. Rankings are based on each firm's average rating in these surveys. These scores measure each firm's generalized labor market status and fit well with sociological conceptualizations of status as an aggregate of peer attributions (Gould, 2002) .
The number of firms included in the top 100 actually varies from year to year and approximately half of all AM Law 200 firms do not make Vault's top 100 each year. Rather than restrict our analysis to only the most prestigious 100 law firms in each year, we obtained prestige scores directly from Vault for all firms identified in Vault's survey exercise -including unranked firms. Firm counts range from 126 firms in 2002 to 166 firms in 2010. This data limitation places an upper bound on the number of firms that can be included in the dyads we analyze; excluded firms may be considered less prestigious than all other firms included in that year. Given the positive empirical correlation between firm prestige and profitability (0.76), this sampling restriction restricts variance within our sample and renders it less likely that our analyses identify status or profitability differential effects than if we analyzed all AM Law 200 firms. In robustness checks, we observe similar results when including unrated firms in the analyzed sample and assigning categorical status ranks over five status tiers instead of continuous status scores.
To estimate the effects of status differentials on the hiring likelihood, we compute status differential between firm i and firm j as the absolute value of the difference between the Vault prestige scores for i and j in that year. We also partition this variable into two separate variables based on whether hiring the hiring firm i or source firm j is higher in status. The variable |Status differential ij |, S i > S j is the absolute value of the prestige score difference between hiring firm i and source firm j when the hiring firm is of higher status. The variable |Status differential ij |, S i < S j is the absolute value of the status difference between i and j when the hiring firm is of lower status. Hypothesis 1 predicts negative coefficients on both of these variables; the coefficient magnitudes indicate whether or not status differentials exert different influences on the likelihoods of hiring from higher or lower status firms.
Profitability differential is based on profits-per-equity-partner (PPEP), or total firm profits divided by the number of firm partners with residual claims, a common industry profitability metric that is obtained from American Lawyer surveys. All else equal, we assume that a partner's compensation is, on average, increasing with their firm's PPEP. We first compute the absolute value of the difference in PPEP (in U.S. dollars) between hiring firm i and source firm j and then partition this variable into two separate variables based on whether the hiring firm is more profitable. The variable |Profitability differential ij |, P i > P j is the absolute value of the dollar profitability difference between hiring firm i and source firm j when the hiring firm is more profitable. The variable |Profitability differential ij |, P i < P j is the absolute value of the dollar profitability difference between hiring firm i and source firm j when the hiring firm is less profitable. Hypothesis 2 predicts negative coefficients on both of these variables; the coefficient magnitudes indicate whether or not profitability differentials exert different influences on the likelihoods of hiring from higher or lower status firms.
To test Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4, we create a set of variables indicating the relative status and profitability of two firms at risk of hiring from one another. One variable identifies dyads in which the hiring firm i is lower in status but more profitable than the source firm j (S i <S j and P i >P j ). A second variable identifies dyads in which the hiring firm i is higher in status but less profitable than the source firm j (S i >S j and P i <P j ). A third variable identifies dyads in which the hiring firm i is lower in status and less profitable than the source firm j (S i <S j and P i <P j ). The omitted indicator identifies dyads in which the hiring firm i is higher status and more profitable than the source firm j. To check that our predictions are insensitive to differential magnitudes, we also test Hypotheses 3 and 4 using continuous measures.
Control variables.
Dyad-level covariates account for factors other than relative status and profitability that may affect the baseline likelihood of lateral hiring. The number of employment opportunities a firm offers and the number of times a firm's employees are hired by competitors are both functions of employee headcount. Firms of different sizes are also likely to differ in terms of the legal work they perform and the clients they serve (Heinz, et al., 2001) . To account for baseline propensities of individuals to transition from one firm to another, we compute size differential as the absolute value of the difference in total number of lawyers (in 100s) employed by hiring firm i and source firm j.
Two variables account for major organizational events that influence both the labor market supply of a firm's partners and the firm's demand for competitors' partners. Dissolved is an indicator variable that equals 1 when either hiring firm i or source firm j dissolves in a given year and 0 otherwise.
Lawyers employed by firms that dissolve are more likely to be hired by other firms than lawyers whose firms survive the entire year and firms about to dissolve probably curtail hiring to survive. Merged is an indicator variable taking a value of 1 when either the hiring firm i or source firm j merges with another firm in a given year and 0 otherwise. A merger may indicate either future firm growth plans or, conversely, the culmination of a firm growth plan; both influence the likelihood of lateral hiring.
Geographic distance influences search costs for potential employers and candidates and adjustment costs imposed by changing employers. We first compute the spherical distances between each of firm i's offices and each of firm j's offices based on their respective longitudes and latitudes (Sorenson and Audia, 2000) . Using data on firm-office headcount obtained from the National Law Journal's annual survey of the 250 largest U.S. law firms, we weight each distance by the product of the numbers of lawyers in the two offices, take the sum of all weighted distances, and divide this by the product of the total number of lawyers in the two offices. The resulting mean geographic distance variable is a headcount-weighted measure of the average geographic distance, in hundreds of miles, between a randomly chosen firm i lawyer and a randomly chosen firm j lawyer.
The variable S i > S j takes a value of 1 when hiring firm i is higher in status and 0 when the source firm j is higher in status. This variable accounts for baseline tendencies of partners to move from lowerstatus to higher-status firms. Partitioning the status differential variable based on whether firm i is higher or lower status is equivalent to specifying an interaction term between the status differential and this indicator variable. Hence, this indicator must be included in all models that partition status differential in order to obtain accurate coefficient estimates. Similarly, P i > P j is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 when hiring firm i is more profitable and 0 when source firm j is more profitable. This variable accounts for baseline tendencies of partners to move between more or less profitable firms.
Two variables reflect the relative position of the two firms in the status and profitability distributions, respectively. Average status is the average of hiring firm i's status and source firm j's status. This variable captures any potential differences in the baseline likelihood of a lateral transition when the firms are high in status compared to when both firms are low in status 3 . Similarly, average profit is the average of hiring firm i's PPEP and source firm j's PPEP.
Because growing and contracting organizations differ in their propensities to hire or lose employees (Freeman and Hannan, 1975) , we include four control variables to account for the propensities of firm i and firm j to hire or lose partners each year. We include the previous year's counts of partner hires by i, departures from i, hires by j, and departures from j. We include two more specific control variables to account for prior movement of partners between i and j, because such hires may enable employers to learn about potential candidates or candidates to learn about potential employers. Firms might also hire individuals from the same competitors from which it hired in the past, based on co-worker complementarities (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990) . Therefore, we include number of partner hires by firm i from firm j in the prior year and departures from firm i to firm j in the prior year. These variables also serve as controls for otherwise unobserved differences across dyads.
Areas of legal practice vary across firms. For most firms in our sample, we collected data on firm practice areas from the annually published Vault Guide to the Top Law Firms. We then constructed a measure of practice area overlap between i and j as follows:
where takes a value of 1 if firm i is in practice area k and 0 otherwise, and likewise takes a value of 1 if firm j is in practice area k and 0 otherwise. The numerator counts the number of practice areas common to both firms, and the denominator normalizes by the number of practice areas that are present in either firm. In other words, this variable is a Jaccard coefficient that indexes the intersection of two sets as a proportion of their union, taking a value of 1 when two sets are identical. 4 In our sample, practice overlap is roughly normally distributed (mean = 0.29; s.d. = 0.13) and exhibits near-zero correlations with the dyadic status (-0.07) and profitability (-0.09) differentials. These figures suggest that status and profitability differences are unlikely to absorb the effects of unmeasured differences in practice areas.
But, for all dyads for which we obtained practice area for both firm i and firm j (87 percent of all dyads)
we subject our key findings to accounting for practice area overlap.
Dyadic observations are not independent because firms appear in multiple dyads. We include Lincoln's (1984) autocorrelation control variable, which for a given dyad of hiring firm i and source firm j is the mean value of the dependent variable across all other dyads in which either i or j appears. This variable controls for firm-level tendencies to hire or lose lawyers each year. 5 All hiring models include unreported year fixed effects to account for secular trends in lateral hiring; no constant is reported because the constant represents the omitted year's effect. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables included in the analyses.
-----------------------------------------Insert Table 2 About Here -----------------------------------------
Figure 2 depicts conditional probabilities of hiring from a more profitable competitor and losing an employee to a lower status competitor -comparisons relevant to Hypotheses 3 and 4. These probabilities are obtained from summary statistics and not from multivariate regression coefficients. A few observations are noteworthy. First, consistent with a positive correlation between organizational status and profitability (in our sample, the firm-level pairwise correlation is 0.76), in the vast majority of at-risk dyads the hiring firm i is, relative to source firm j, either (1) higher in status and higher in profitability or (2) lower in status and lower in profitability. The light grey rectangles represent such dyads; note the much larger dyad count (64, 289 vs. 17,383 or 17,060). Although fewer dyads deviate from the positive status-profitability correlation (the black rectangles), the rate of lateral hiring is significantly more likely when one differential is positive and one is negative than when both profitability and status differentials are positive or both are negative.
Second, consistent with a status-based hiring advantage, the probability of hiring an employee from a more profitable competitor is significantly greater if the hiring firm is higher in status than if the hiring firm is lower in status than the competitor (2.3% vs. 2.1%). Third, consistent with a status-based retention advantage, the probability of losing an employee to a lower status competitor is significantly greater if the competitor is more profitable than if the competitor is less profitable than the source firm (3.2% vs. 2.1%). These comparisons suggest that high status organizations have labor market advantages in hiring and retaining employees; our dyadic analyses account for alternative explanations. 5 The reported results are robust to computing this variable for the entire period of observation instead of annually. Table 4 reports results of rare-event logit models of the likelihood that firm i hires a partner from firm j in year t. Model 1 is the baseline model specification with only control variables. Several variables increase the baseline likelihood of lateral hiring. The likelihood increases with similarity in size and with geographic proximity. The likelihood that a firm i hires from firm j increases with the number of partners in the prior year who departed firm i, departed firm j, moved from firm j to firm i, and moved from firm i to firm j. The higher the mean status of the dyad, the more likely it is that one firm hires from the other.
-----------------------------------------

Insert Figure 2 About Here -----------------------------------------Results
Finally, the higher the dyad's mean profitability the less likely it is that one firm hires from the other.
-----------------------------------------Insert Table 4 About Here -----------------------------------------Model 2 includes three variables to test for effects of status differentials on the likelihood of firm
i hiring from firm j: (1) the absolute status differential when the hiring firm is higher in status, (2) the absolute status differential when the hiring firm is lower in status, and (3) a variable that indicates whether the hiring firm is higher in status. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the larger the status difference between two firms, the lower the likelihood that one will hires the other. This effect is true for both negative and positive status differentials.
Model 3 includes three variables to examine effects of profitability differentials on the likelihood of firm i hiring from another firm j: (1) the absolute profitability differential when the hiring firm is more profitable, (2) the absolute profitability differential when the hiring firm is less profitable, and (3) a variable that indicates whether the hiring firm is more profitable. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the larger the profitability difference between two firms, the less likely it is that one firm hires from the other. This effect is true for both negative and positive profitability differentials.
We then examine hiring and retention advantages of status. Model 4 provides a test of Hypothesis 3. In Model 4, hiring from more profitable competitors corresponds to the variables indicating that P i < P j . Hypothesis 3 predicts that higher status firms are more likely to hire from more profitable significantly different from the baseline. The difference between the two coefficients is statistically significant (p<0.001). This implies that a firm is more likely to lose employees to a lower status competitor when the competitor is more profitable than when the competitor is less profitable.
In Model 5, we further probe Hypotheses 3 and 4. As prior models indicate, firms typically do not hire from more profitable competitors or lose employees to lower status competitors. In other words, profitability and status differentials have negative marginal effects on the likelihood of hiring. But, Hypothesis 3 suggests that status helps hiring firms overcome negative profitability differentials.
Hypothesis 4 suggests that although profitability helps firms overcome negative status differentials, lower status competitors must be -atypically -more profitable than a higher status competitor to hire an employee away from that competitor. To test these implications, we examine whether or not the marginal effects of status and profitability differentials differ across the conditions represented in Figure 2 . If higher status allows a firm to hire from more profitable competitors than it could otherwise, then the effect of |Profitability differential ij |, P i < P j , which is typically negative, should be weaker when S i > S j than when S i < S j . The estimates in Model 5 suggest that this is the case. The variable |Profitability differential ij |, P i < P j , S i > S j has no significant effect, while the variable |Profitability differential ij |, P i < P j , S i < S j has a significant negative effect. Table 4 , Figure 3 plots the marginal effect of source firm j's higher profitability on the likelihood that firm i hires from firm j. Dark black lines represent all dyads in which hiring firm i is lower in status than source firm j; light gray lines represent dyads in which i is higher in status than j. Solid lines represent the estimated marginal effect, bounded by a dashed line 95 percent confidence interval. When firm i is lower in status than firm j, the confidence interval for the marginal effect of j's profitability differential is below zero, implying a significant negative effect on the likelihood of hiring. But, when firm i is higher in status than j, the confidence interval is not statistically different from zero except when j is much, much more profitable than i. At almost all points the confidence intervals do not intersect, indicating that the marginal effect of j's profitability differential is significantly stronger when firm i is lower in status than when firm i is higher in status.
Using coefficients from Model 5 in
To put these effects in context, a firm's probability of hiring from a higher status competitor decreases by 10 percent for every $100,000 more in profits per equity partner that the competitor makes relative to the firm 6 . Conversely, for higher status firms, the probability of hiring from a more profitable competitor decreases by only 0.05 percent for every $100,000 more in profits per equity partner that the competitor makes relative to the firm. The confidence intervals imply that when higher status firms can just as easily hire from more profitable competitors that make up to $1 million more in profits per equity partner as they can from equally profitable competitors. Consistent with a status-based hiring advantage, high status firms are more likely to hire more profitable competitors' employees than are low status firms.
-----------------------------------------Insert Figure 3 About Here -----------------------------------------
Model 5 also examines retention advantages of status. If lower status competitors must be more profitable in order to hire a higher status firm's employees, then the effect of |Status differential ij |, S i < S j , which is typically negative, should be weaker when P i > P j than when P i < P j . The estimates in Model 5 suggest that this is so. The variable |Status differential ij |, S i < S j and P i > P j has no significant effect, while the variable |Status differential ij |, S i < S j and P i < P j has a significant negative effect.
Using coefficients from Model 5 in Table 4 , Figure 4 plots the marginal effect of a firm's greater status over a competitor on the firm's likelihood of losing employees to that competitor. Note that in this case the competitor is the hiring firm, and, therefore, denoted by subscript i. Dark black lines represent cases in which i is less profitable than j and light gray lines represent cases in which i is more profitable than j. Solid lines represent the estimated marginal effect, bounded by a dashed line 95 percent confidence interval. When a competitor is less profitable than a firm, the confidence interval for the marginal effect of the firm's status differential over the competitor is below zero, implying a significant negative effect on likelihood of losing employees to that competitor. But, when a competitor is more profitable than the firm, the confidence interval includes zero, implying no significant effect. At all points, the confidence intervals do not intersect, indicating that the marginal effect of a firm's positive status differential is significantly stronger when competitors are less profitable.
To put these effects in context, when a competitor is less profitable than a firm, the firm's probability of losing an employee to that competitor decreases by approximately 40 percent for every 1 unit higher in status than the competitor (approximately 25 ranks higher).
7 Conversely, the probability of losing an employee to a more profitable competitor is insensitive to the dyad's status differential.
Consistent with a status-based retention advantage, high status firms typically lose employees to lower status competitors only if those competitors are, atypically, also more profitable.
Robustness checks.
We check the robustness of our results to alternative analytical decisions.
One concern is that status and profitability differentials might absorb the effects of unmeasured 7 The marginal effect of a firm's status differential on probability of losing an employee is -0.008 per 1 unit in status. A change of -0.008 represents a 40 percent decrease relative to the unconditional probability of hiring, which is 0.2. differences in practice areas between firms, which could affect the likelihood of hiring. In Model 6 we estimate the fully specified model on the sub-sample of dyads for which we have practice area information for both i and j (87 percent of all dyads). Greater practice area overlap does indeed have a significant positive effect on the likelihood of hiring. But, the coefficient estimates for status and profitability differentials are virtually identical in specifications that do and do not include this overlap variable. Given the various lagged dependent variables already included in the specification, this seems unsurprising. But, our findings seem insensitive to practice differences across dyads.
Another possible concern is non-independence of observations, which potentially affects our sample in two ways. First, dyadic differentials may be correlated over time and, therefore, dyads are not independent. Second, the dyadic nature of the data means that each firm i appears across multiple observations, and i's attributes do not vary within year. The same is true for each firm j. If the main effects of interest are primarily being driven by variation in firm-level attributes -e.g. by just the hiring firm's status rather than dyadic differentials -then standard errors could be underestimated because firmlevel attributes are not independent across dyads. Table 4 's results are conditional on our use of Lincoln's (1984) method and clustering errors at the dyad level. In supplementary analyses, we instead clustered on firm i and firm j and found results consistent with those reported here. More conservatively, we also used two-way clustering to simultaneously account for non-independence across all dyads containing firm i and all dyads containing firm j (Petersen, 2009 ). When observations are not independent, two-way clustering simultaneously on multiple non-nested groupings produces the largest standard error estimates in dyadic data and therefore the most conservative coefficient estimates. Our main results are virtually identical across all clustering approaches.
8 Based on these analyses and the descriptive statistics, we are confident that our results are not merely attributable to the non-independence of observations.
Another possible concern is that we have treated status and profitability differentials between firms as varying continuously when categorical differences might be more relevant. Although our hypotheses are supported with both dichotomous and continuous differential measures in Table 4 , we probed this issue more extensively. Specifically, we divided firms into five status tiers and five profitability tiers, where the highest tier consists of the top-25 firms, the next tiers contain firms ranked 26 to 50, 51 to 75, 76 to 100, and the last tier contains firms ranked below than 100 (including unranked firms). This approach accounts for the possibility that the Vault prestige scores are overly precise or that the AM Law profitability figures are extensively managed by firms on a year-to-year basis.
In Model 7 of Table 5 we replace the continuous status differentials with dummy variables, indicating whether firm i is in a higher status tier (S i > S j ) or lower status tier than firm j (S i < S j ). The excluded category represents dyads in which the two firms are in the same status tier (S i = S j ). We similarly replace the continuous profitability differentials with dummy variables, indicating whether firm i is in a higher profitability tier (P i > P j ) or a lower profitability tier than firm j (P i < P j ). The excluded category includes dyads in which the two firms are within the same profitability profit tier (P i = P j ). The coefficients for all four dummy variables are negative and significantly different from the baseline, supporting Hypotheses 1 and 2. Firms are less likely to hire from competitors in higher or lower profitability tiers than from competitors in the same profitability tier. Firms are also less likely to lose employees to competitors in lower or higher status tiers than to competitors in the same status tier. Table 5 About Here
Model 8 examines the implications of tiers for hiring and retention advantages. Here, the excluded category consists of dyads in which the two firms are in the same profitability and same status tier (S i =S j , P i =P j ). Hypothesis 3 implies that the variable for S i >S j , P i <P j should have a larger coefficient than the variable for S i <S j , P i <P j . Support for this prediction can be easily seen in the coefficient and error estimates for these two variables in Model 8. The difference is statistically significant (p<0.001). A firm is more likely to hire from a competitor in a higher profitability tier when the hiring firm is in a higher status tier. Hypothesis 4 implies that the variable for S i <S j , P i >P j should have a larger coefficient than the variable for S i <S j , P i <P j . Support for this prediction is seen in the coefficient and error estimates for these two variables in Model 8. The difference between the two coefficients is statistically significant (p<0.001). A firm is more likely to lose employees to a competitor in a lower status tier when the competitor is in a higher profitability tier. These results further support Hypotheses 3 and 4. Consistent with our results using continuous status and profitability differentials, we also find that being in a higher status tier weakens the negative marginal effect of the profitability differential on a firm's likelihood of hiring from a higher profitability tier. When a firm is lower in status, it is less likely to hire from a competitor in a higher profitability tier than a competitor in the same profitability tier. But when a firm is in a higher status tier, it is no less likely to hire from a competitor in a higher profitability tier than to hire from a competitor in the same profitability tier 9 . These results further support our argument that high status firms have a hiring advantage over lower status competitors. We also find that a competitor has to be in a higher profitability tier to weaken the negative marginal effect of status differential on its likelihood of hiring from a higher status tier. When a competitor is less profitable, it is less likely to hire from a firm in a higher status tier than a firm in the same status tier. But when a competitor is in a higher profitability tier, it is no less likely to hire from a firm in a higher status tier than to hire from a firm in the same status tier
10
. These results further support our argument that high status firms have a retention advantage over lower status competitors. Several conditions bound the generalizability of our findings. First, the theorized trade-offs between pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits are probably most advantageous in human capital intensive industries (e.g., professional services) in which employees represent the primary production technology and large capital investments are atypical. Status is, of course, particularly valuable in such industries because quality is difficult to verify ex ante. Second, the legal profession is characterized by increasing mobility and a common method for delineating employee contributions to organizational profitability (i.e., a partner's "book of business"). Future research might test our arguments in settings where individuals' contributions are not so readily delineated.
Concluding Discussion
Third, we explicitly assumed -based on prior research -that pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits vary, respectively, with organizational profitability and status. Although we cannot observe employment terms in our data, recent work is consistent with our arguments (Bidwell, et al., 2013 broadly the trade-offs that individuals accept to work for particular employers (e.g., Stern, 2004) .
At the organization and industry levels, our results suggest that lateral hiring stabilizes industry status hierarchies. Low status organizations that exhibit atypically high profitability are most likely to hire employees away from higher status but less profitable competitors. But, these organizations are also at greatest risk of losing employees to those competitors. When a low status organization is most likely to capitalize on atypically high profitability, it is also most vulnerable to losing the employees responsible for producing profits. Conversely, when a high status organization is most likely to lose employees due to low profitability that organization is also likely to shore up profitability by hiring employees away from more profitable competitors. These scenarios imply that high status organizations likely restore profitability to levels consistent with their status via hiring while low status organizations find it difficult to sustain abnormally high profitability that might enhance their status. Future research might, therefore, investigate hiring from competitors as a mechanism that reproduces the frequently-observed positive correlation between organizational status and profitability. Such inquiries would answer recent calls to investigate how dyadic exchanges shape status hierarchies (Lynn, Podolny, and Tao, 2010; Sauder, Lynn, and Podolny, 2012) .
Our arguments imply that hiring aids organizational status attainment, a phenomenon that has received much less attention than individual status attainment has (see Lin, 1999 for a review) but seems to be attracting growing scholarly interest. For example, Tortoriello, et al., (2011) (Bothner, Smith, and White, 2010; Askin and Bothner, 2012) . Surprisingly, no prior studies directly address the question of whether or not strategic efforts to attain greater status actually produce benefits in excess of attainment costs.
Hiring seems one mechanism by which organizations gain and lose status. Alternatively, preparing employees for positions at higher status employers might also influence status changes through status transfer (Baty, et al., 1971; Podolny and Phillips, 1996) . Consider that the "entrepreneurs as organizational products" literature demonstrates that some organizations prepare employees for entrepreneurship better than others (Freeman, 1986; Burton, et al., 2002) . Similarly, many individuals believe that some organizations are better than others at preparing employees for future attainment (e.g., Bidwell, et al., 2013) . Other work documents how employees' prior employment affiliations benefit employers (e.g., Carnahan and Somaya, 2013) . In contrast to extant research that treats lateral hiring as potentially deleterious to organizations (e.g., Coff, 1997; Hillman, 2002; Broschak, 2004; Gardner, 2005) , future work might consider that losing employees to higher status competitors might be status-enhancing for both individual and organization. Hiring firm is higher status (n=17,383).
Conditional probabilities of hiring from a more profitable competitor (H3).
2.1%
3.2%
Hiring firm is less profitable (n=64,289).
Hiring firm is more profitable (n=17,060).
Conditional probabilities of losing an employee to a lower status competitor (H4). -0.531 *** (0.031) P i > P j (0/1) 0.189 *** (0.055) |Profitability differential ij |, P i < P j -0.076 *** (0.007) |Profitability differential ij |, P i > P j -0.132 *** (0.008) S i < S j and P i < P j (0/1) -0.078 0.221 ** -0.197 * (0.050) (0.077) (0.080) S i < S j and P i > P j (0/1) 0.227 *** -0.097 -0.247 ** (0.066) (0.093) (0.096) S i > S j and P i < P j (0/1) 0.313 *** -0.023 -0.300 *** (0.060) (0.097) (0.088) |Status differential ij |, S i > S j -0.427 *** -0.409 *** (0.037) (0.039) |Status differential ij |, S i < S j and P i > P j -0.140 † -0.125 (0.079) (0.080) |Status differential ij |, S i < S j and P i < P j -0.305 *** -0.309 *** (0.035) (0.037) |Profitability differential ij |, P i > P j -0.087 *** -0.084 *** (0.010) (0.010) |Profitability differential ij |, P i < P j and S i > S j -0.017 -0.019 (0.017) (0.018) |Profitability differential ij |, P i < P j and S i < S j -0.044 *** -0.041 ** All models include unreported year fixed effects. 
